This is mostly behaviorism and other-minds skepticism, the substance of which I have already addressed.
and though you can split hairs over the definition all you want, "intelligence" ultimately means "exhibiting human behavior".
That is exactly the behaviorist thing I'm rejecting. Intelligence is not behavior that looks intelligent to an observer. Intelligence is a cognitive faculty. External behavior is evidence of intelligence only in the right context, it is not the thing itself.
but humans cannot directly perceive other consciousnesses, they can only perceive things like light and sound and interpret those signals as another object exhibiting intelligence,
Correct, I do not directly perceive consciousness, but I infer it. I infer it from a living organism of the same kind as myself, with the same biological structure, perceptual organs, needs, actions, development, vulnerability, and self-directed behavior in the world.
That is not even remotely the same as inferring consciousness from disembodied text, images, or sounds generated by a digital system whose symbols only mean anything to the humans interpreting them.
A human speaking is a conscious living organism expressing thought through language. A chatbot outputting text is machinery producing human-interpreted symbols.
Treating those as equivalent because both can produce language is exactly the category error that I'm criticizing in the thread.
Long story short, the fact that many humans can be fooled by sufficiently persuasive output does not erase the distinction between consciousness and simulation, or between intelligence and intelligence-imitating behavior.
the real pressing issue is how soon I will be able to generate myself a big titty goth GF.
Unironically the more honest use case of generative systems. Synthetic fantasy output, not synthetic intelligence.
I am not defending that what we currently have is AI.
That's good, it means we're already aligned on the most practical point.
What remains is the stronger modal dispute though, whether digital computation could ever instantiate intelligence.
Now, you keep saying that I have not proven impossibility. Fair enough, such is the burden. However, "maybe some arrangement could" is not a defense of calling anything AI, it is only a defense of agnosticism about some future possible system, and that distinction matters.
Also the outputs and inputs exist regardless of their meaning
I agree.
However, "input", "output", "symbol", "program", "information", and "representation" are not merely brute physical descriptions. They are relational descriptions, they identify physical states in terms of their role in a system of interpretation or use.
Consider a voltage state, that exists physically. But that this voltage state "means 7" or "means horse" or "means move the pawn to e4" exists only relative to an interpreting mind, or a system already grounded in meaning.
again inteligence is not meaning
Exactly. What I'm saying is that intelligence cannot be severed from awareness, reference, and meaning. An "intelligence" to which nothing means anything is not intelligence.
if it was, no intelligence could arise as you would get infinite descent.
Yup, and there is no infinite regress in my position. Meaning does not require another prior meaning-agent floating behind it forever. For a conscious organism, such as a human, awareness is direct contact with reality, with perception supplying the base and concepts being formed from perceptual awareness. Meaning is grounded in the relation between a conscious subject and reality.
Now, a computer doesn't have that. It has physical state transitions that humans are free to interpret.
It is a fact that intelligence arises from interaction of millions of what is defacto nothing more than biological transistor
This is exactly the reduction I reject.
A neuron is not a biological transistor in the relevant sense. Neurons are living cells inside a living organism, embedded in metabolism, perception, action, development, biological need, and consciousness. A brain is an organ of a living animal, not an isolated switchboard.
A silicon transistor simply is not the same kind of thing.
While you can point to the fact that you can describe both as switching-like in some context, doing that does not establish equivalence. Like a heart valve and a plumbing valve, both regulate flow, but that does not make a plumbing network a circulatory system.
explain then in proper not pseudo intellectual philosophical mumbo jumbo why it cannot arise from interaction of millions of silicon transistors.
A neuron and a transistor both can be described as having on/off-like behavior ("switching") in some contexts. Which in itself is fine. But that does not mean that this switching is what explains intelligence. Lots of things can be compared at a very abstract level.
For instance, a heart valve and a plumbing valve both regulate flow. But that does not mean that a plumbing system is alive.
Or a bird wing and an airplane wing both generate lift. But that does not mean that an airplane is an animal.
Or a camera sensor and an eye both respond to light. But that does not mean that a camera sees.
So when you say that neurons are basically biological transistors, I say that, even if I grant this loose comparison, you still need to show that the transistor-like part is the part that matters for intelligence.
Like, maybe the relevant difference is that neurons are living cells inside a living organisms, unlike transistors. Or maybe the relevant difference is the whole biological system (metabolism, perception, action, development, needs, self-maintenance, and consciousness). Or maybe the relevant difference is that the brain is not an isolated circulation box, but an organ of a living animal.
Essentially, you can't simply pick one abstract similarity (switching) and treat that as if it's the whole story. It's like saying "birds fly, airplanes fly, therefore birds are just meat airplanes". The reduction is obviously not true, even though the similarity is real.
Hardback copy of "Industrial Society and it's Future" is just as valid ISAF as one on my computer.
That is the case because text is a pattern of symbols whose identity is preserved across different media for readers capable of interpreting it.
But a text is not a living process.
Say it with me: a copy of a flame is not a flame, a copy of a river is not a river, a copy of a digestive system is not digestion.
Different kinds of things have different identity conditions. Some things are representational patterns. Some things are physical processes. Some things are living organisms. Some things are conscious subjects.
You cannot simply infer from "a text can be represented in different media" to "a mind can be represented in digital circuitry". It's basically the same representation/instantiation confusion again.
And such property is not restrained to things that have meaning, machine that turns on light each 10 seconds is a machine that turns on light each 10 seconds regardless of it being digital or analog and of existence of any human and intelligence.
The light machine only proves that some functional descriptions are substrate-flexible. A machine that turns on a light every 10 seconds can be analog, digital, stereo, mono, I don't care, Mr. Breaker is a hard act to follow. That is because the function in question is just the physical production of timed light-output.
Intelligence, however, is not merely "produce x output at y interval" or "produce correct answer to prompt x". The question is whether the system understands, perceives, judges, values, forms concepts, and grasps meaning. For some reason you are assuming those are substrate-flexible, seemingly just because trivial mechanical functions are. I mean, if you can show how intelligence is substrate-flexible to the extent that it can be instantiated via formal computation, you'd refute my argument in this thread.
If you are claiming that there is no non trivial zeros of Riemann zeta function you need to provide proof that it is the case, Riemann Hypothesis is not proven because there are no known counter examples.
Yes, if I claim impossibility, I owe an argument. However, the absence of a known counterexample does not establish possibility either. "You have not disproven it" is not proof that the category is non-empty.
Basically, if your position is "I don't know whether artificial intelligence is possible in some future non-natural system", that's fine, it's agnosticism.
But if your position is "digital computation could instantiate intelligence" then you owe an account for how formal switching becomes awareness, how externally interpreted symbols become meaning for the system itself, how representation becomes possession, and how a subject appears.
And if your position is "current systems are artificial intelligence" then I reject that entirely. Which is not a problem for you, since you already said you are not defending it.
The notion that digital computation as such can become intelligence is still unsupported. My claim that it is categorically impossible is extreme, but that just means, like I said in the very first line in the first post of the thread, if a single counterexample can be shown, or a proof of possibility can be made, then my position is dead as a doornail.