Neither computer software nor computer hardware can ever, not even in a trillion years, possibly instantiate AI - change my mind

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Burden of proof that something is impossible is on you as you are the claimant.
There's two different burden of proof issues, to be precise.
If someone calls current systems "artificial intelligence", the burden is on them to show intelligence. They'd need to show awareness, understanding, meaning, concept formation, judgment, etc.
And they have not done that. The only thing that has been shown is useful output. Which is not intelligence.

Separately to that, I am making the stronger claim that digital computation as such cannot instantiate intelligence. Which I am defending. But I am not defending it by saying that individual computer parts are unintelligent, therefore the whole cannot be intelligent.
The argument is that a digital computer is a formal switching system. Its "symbols", "inputs", "outputs", "programs", and "information" are meaningful only relative to conscious users and designers interpreting them. They do not exist for the machine.
Now, the question is how formal switching can become awareness. How externally interpreted symbols become meaning for the system itself. How representation becomes possession. How a physical system becomes a subject to whom anything appears. "Maybe some arrangement could" is not an answer.
as despite my neurons constantly being replaced i am still alive. Clearly then existence of me and is not dependent on some specific phisical representation, if thats the case then i see no reason why i cannot be represented as digital circuit.
The fact that a living organism maintains identity while its material constituents are metabolically replaced does not prove that the organism can be replaced by an arbitrary representation. A bit of an abstract point, so let me clarify it.
A river remains a river even if its water changes. A drawing of a river is not a river.
Or a flame persists while the fuel is replaced. But a simulation of a flame does not burn.
The same way, a body replaces cells while maintaining a biological organization. But a digital representation of the body is not thereby alive.
The continuity of a living process is not the same thing as a substrate-independent digital representation.
I do not know if it is possible or not, infact i think that there is no human that does. A claim that something is impossible requires proof which you have failed to provide.
Then you're not defending the term "AI", rather I think you're defending agnosticism.
"You have not disproven every conceivable arrangement" is not enough to overturn the distinction between a conscious organism and a digital symbol manipulation system. I say until someone can show how awareness, meaning, concept formation, and subjectivity arise in the system itself, "AI" is and remains an unjustified category assignment. Like I said, the burden of proof there is on the people who call it AI.
 
Current "AI" is not merely overhyped, but the category label itself is false.

yes. because "AI" in its current usage is vernacular, not a precise usage. and it's an intentional act of marketing. generative algorithms, which are half a century old (older if you count their mathematical origins), appear to the retard to be a sudden, wondrous gain of function, more complex than the things computers could do before. to the brainlet, "AI" means "computer do smart thing" and producing a picture from nothing is something computers aren't supposed to be able to do. so the term "AI" has been adopted to describe this kind of function, and embraced by the companies making this software, because it lends them an image of genius innovation that is like pure, uncut crack to all the tech fags like Sam Altman and Elon who dream of themselves as Übermensch.
 
to the deeper point of whether generative algorithms represent a form of synthetic intelligence: who can say? the precursors of human consciousness are a mystery, and though you can split hairs over the definition all you want, "intelligence" ultimately means "exhibiting human behavior". but humans cannot directly perceive other consciousnesses, they can only perceive things like light and sound and interpret those signals as another object exhibiting intelligence, and computers can mimic the light and sound signals of intelligent human behaviors in a number of ways. does that mean some kind of consciousness is occurring beyond the screen? it's impossible to say. perhaps, to a higher being, humans appear to be a crude collection of linear programming instructions encoded in flesh, able to be manipulated at will. and yet, we experience consciousness. the debate is moot. the real pressing issue is how soon I will be able to generate myself a big titty goth GF.
 
There's two different burden of proof issues, to be precise.
If someone calls current systems "artificial intelligence", the burden is on them to show intelligence. They'd need to show awareness, understanding, meaning, concept formation, judgment, etc.
And they have not done that. The only thing that has been shown is useful output. Which is not intelligence.

Separately to that, I am making the stronger claim that digital computation as such cannot instantiate intelligence. Which I am defending. But I am not defending it by saying that individual computer parts are unintelligent, therefore the whole cannot be intelligent.
The argument is that a digital computer is a formal switching system. Its "symbols", "inputs", "outputs", "programs", and "information" are meaningful only relative to conscious users and designers interpreting them. They do not exist for the machine.
Now, the question is how formal switching can become awareness. How externally interpreted symbols become meaning for the system itself. How representation becomes possession. How a physical system becomes a subject to whom anything appears. "Maybe some arrangement could" is not an answer.
I am not defending that what we currently have is AI. Also the outputs and inputs exist regardless of their meaning, again inteligence is not meaning - if it was, no intelligence could arise as you would get infinite descent. What i am defending is claim that you have not shown that such arrangement cannot exists, and "maybe some arrangement could" is valid defense of such position as in order to claim what you want to claim you need to proof that there is no such arrangement.
It is a fact that intelligence arises from interaction of millions of what is defacto nothing more than biological transistor, explain then in proper not pseudo intellectual philosophical mumbo jumbo why it cannot arise from interaction of millions of silicon transistors.
The fact that a living organism maintains identity while its material constituents are metabolically replaced does not prove that the organism can be replaced by an arbitrary representation. A bit of an abstract point, so let me clarify it.
A river remains a river even if its water changes. A drawing of a river is not a river.
Or a flame persists while the fuel is replaced. But a simulation of a flame does not burn.
The same way, a body replaces cells while maintaining a biological organization. But a digital representation of the body is not thereby alive.
The continuity of a living process is not the same thing as a substrate-independent digital representation.
Hardback copy of "Industrial Society and it's Future" is just as valid ISAF as one on my computer. The specific range of representations that are needed for something to be what it still is, depends on what it is. And such property is not restrained to things that have meaning, machine that turns on light each 10 seconds is a machine that turns on light each 10 seconds regardless of it being digital or analog and of existence of any human and intelligence. Things exist regardless of meaning that we give them.
Then you're not defending the term "AI", rather I think you're defending agnosticism.
"You have not disproven every conceivable arrangement" is not enough to overturn the distinction between a conscious organism and a digital symbol manipulation system. I say until someone can show how awareness, meaning, concept formation, and subjectivity arise in the system itself, "AI" is and remains an unjustified category assignment. Like I said, the burden of proof there is on the people who call it AI.
It is justified category as it is something that can be described. An Artifical Intelligence is intelligence that have nor arisen naturally, you may argue that it is empty but you have not proven that.
What exactly makes an inteligence is open and infact i suspect that there is no closed form that can answer such question.
If you are claiming that there is no non trivial zeros of Riemann zeta function you need to provide proof that it is the case, Riemann Hypothesis is not proven because there are no known counter examples.
 
Ostatnio edytowane:
Consciousness can be a real, natural, biological faculty without being reducible to "just computation" or "just mechanism" in the crude watch sense
Describing the body in terms of chemical gradients, neurons, hormones, electrical activity etc. does not explain away consciousness
To me "consciousness" is inseparable from will, decision making and agency. If a human is just a collection of physical processes, ticking their way down the chemical/energy gradient like a wound watch, then "consciousness" could only be a passive phenomenon, a helpless passenger in a complex machine.

If free will exists, if you can choose among outcomes, then there is something above & outside the laws of physics, chemistry, etc. as we know them. And that's what makes us alive and human rather than simply machines.
 
This is mostly behaviorism and other-minds skepticism, the substance of which I have already addressed.
and though you can split hairs over the definition all you want, "intelligence" ultimately means "exhibiting human behavior".
That is exactly the behaviorist thing I'm rejecting. Intelligence is not behavior that looks intelligent to an observer. Intelligence is a cognitive faculty. External behavior is evidence of intelligence only in the right context, it is not the thing itself.
but humans cannot directly perceive other consciousnesses, they can only perceive things like light and sound and interpret those signals as another object exhibiting intelligence,
Correct, I do not directly perceive consciousness, but I infer it. I infer it from a living organism of the same kind as myself, with the same biological structure, perceptual organs, needs, actions, development, vulnerability, and self-directed behavior in the world.
That is not even remotely the same as inferring consciousness from disembodied text, images, or sounds generated by a digital system whose symbols only mean anything to the humans interpreting them.
A human speaking is a conscious living organism expressing thought through language. A chatbot outputting text is machinery producing human-interpreted symbols.
Treating those as equivalent because both can produce language is exactly the category error that I'm criticizing in the thread.

Long story short, the fact that many humans can be fooled by sufficiently persuasive output does not erase the distinction between consciousness and simulation, or between intelligence and intelligence-imitating behavior.
the real pressing issue is how soon I will be able to generate myself a big titty goth GF.
Unironically the more honest use case of generative systems. Synthetic fantasy output, not synthetic intelligence.



I am not defending that what we currently have is AI.
That's good, it means we're already aligned on the most practical point.
What remains is the stronger modal dispute though, whether digital computation could ever instantiate intelligence.
Now, you keep saying that I have not proven impossibility. Fair enough, such is the burden. However, "maybe some arrangement could" is not a defense of calling anything AI, it is only a defense of agnosticism about some future possible system, and that distinction matters.
Also the outputs and inputs exist regardless of their meaning
I agree.
However, "input", "output", "symbol", "program", "information", and "representation" are not merely brute physical descriptions. They are relational descriptions, they identify physical states in terms of their role in a system of interpretation or use.
Consider a voltage state, that exists physically. But that this voltage state "means 7" or "means horse" or "means move the pawn to e4" exists only relative to an interpreting mind, or a system already grounded in meaning.
again inteligence is not meaning
Exactly. What I'm saying is that intelligence cannot be severed from awareness, reference, and meaning. An "intelligence" to which nothing means anything is not intelligence.
if it was, no intelligence could arise as you would get infinite descent.
Yup, and there is no infinite regress in my position. Meaning does not require another prior meaning-agent floating behind it forever. For a conscious organism, such as a human, awareness is direct contact with reality, with perception supplying the base and concepts being formed from perceptual awareness. Meaning is grounded in the relation between a conscious subject and reality.
Now, a computer doesn't have that. It has physical state transitions that humans are free to interpret.
It is a fact that intelligence arises from interaction of millions of what is defacto nothing more than biological transistor
This is exactly the reduction I reject.
A neuron is not a biological transistor in the relevant sense. Neurons are living cells inside a living organism, embedded in metabolism, perception, action, development, biological need, and consciousness. A brain is an organ of a living animal, not an isolated switchboard.
A silicon transistor simply is not the same kind of thing.
While you can point to the fact that you can describe both as switching-like in some context, doing that does not establish equivalence. Like a heart valve and a plumbing valve, both regulate flow, but that does not make a plumbing network a circulatory system.
explain then in proper not pseudo intellectual philosophical mumbo jumbo why it cannot arise from interaction of millions of silicon transistors.
A neuron and a transistor both can be described as having on/off-like behavior ("switching") in some contexts. Which in itself is fine. But that does not mean that this switching is what explains intelligence. Lots of things can be compared at a very abstract level.
For instance, a heart valve and a plumbing valve both regulate flow. But that does not mean that a plumbing system is alive.
Or a bird wing and an airplane wing both generate lift. But that does not mean that an airplane is an animal.
Or a camera sensor and an eye both respond to light. But that does not mean that a camera sees.
So when you say that neurons are basically biological transistors, I say that, even if I grant this loose comparison, you still need to show that the transistor-like part is the part that matters for intelligence.
Like, maybe the relevant difference is that neurons are living cells inside a living organisms, unlike transistors. Or maybe the relevant difference is the whole biological system (metabolism, perception, action, development, needs, self-maintenance, and consciousness). Or maybe the relevant difference is that the brain is not an isolated circulation box, but an organ of a living animal.
Essentially, you can't simply pick one abstract similarity (switching) and treat that as if it's the whole story. It's like saying "birds fly, airplanes fly, therefore birds are just meat airplanes". The reduction is obviously not true, even though the similarity is real.
Hardback copy of "Industrial Society and it's Future" is just as valid ISAF as one on my computer.
That is the case because text is a pattern of symbols whose identity is preserved across different media for readers capable of interpreting it.
But a text is not a living process.
Say it with me: a copy of a flame is not a flame, a copy of a river is not a river, a copy of a digestive system is not digestion.
Different kinds of things have different identity conditions. Some things are representational patterns. Some things are physical processes. Some things are living organisms. Some things are conscious subjects.
You cannot simply infer from "a text can be represented in different media" to "a mind can be represented in digital circuitry". It's basically the same representation/instantiation confusion again.
And such property is not restrained to things that have meaning, machine that turns on light each 10 seconds is a machine that turns on light each 10 seconds regardless of it being digital or analog and of existence of any human and intelligence.
The light machine only proves that some functional descriptions are substrate-flexible. A machine that turns on a light every 10 seconds can be analog, digital, stereo, mono, I don't care, Mr. Breaker is a hard act to follow. That is because the function in question is just the physical production of timed light-output.
Intelligence, however, is not merely "produce x output at y interval" or "produce correct answer to prompt x". The question is whether the system understands, perceives, judges, values, forms concepts, and grasps meaning. For some reason you are assuming those are substrate-flexible, seemingly just because trivial mechanical functions are. I mean, if you can show how intelligence is substrate-flexible to the extent that it can be instantiated via formal computation, you'd refute my argument in this thread.
If you are claiming that there is no non trivial zeros of Riemann zeta function you need to provide proof that it is the case, Riemann Hypothesis is not proven because there are no known counter examples.
Yes, if I claim impossibility, I owe an argument. However, the absence of a known counterexample does not establish possibility either. "You have not disproven it" is not proof that the category is non-empty.

Basically, if your position is "I don't know whether artificial intelligence is possible in some future non-natural system", that's fine, it's agnosticism.
But if your position is "digital computation could instantiate intelligence" then you owe an account for how formal switching becomes awareness, how externally interpreted symbols become meaning for the system itself, how representation becomes possession, and how a subject appears.
And if your position is "current systems are artificial intelligence" then I reject that entirely. Which is not a problem for you, since you already said you are not defending it.

The notion that digital computation as such can become intelligence is still unsupported. My claim that it is categorically impossible is extreme, but that just means, like I said in the very first line in the first post of the thread, if a single counterexample can be shown, or a proof of possibility can be made, then my position is dead as a doornail.
 
Sorry, overlooked you by accident.
To me "consciousness" is inseparable from will, decision making and agency.
I agree.
then there is something above & outside the laws of physics, chemistry, etc. as we know them.
I disagree.
If a human is just a collection of physical processes, ticking their way down the chemical/energy gradient like a wound watch, then "consciousness" could only be a passive phenomenon, a helpless passenger in a complex machine.
A living organism is not a watch. A watch is an externally assembled artifact that's passively running down according to a mechanism imposed on it from outside. A human being is a living, self-maintaining organism. A human consciousness is not an ornamental passenger sitting inside the machinery. It is one of the organism's faculties.
Describing the human body in terms of neurons, hormones, electrical activity, chemistry etc. does not prove that consciousness is passive or an illusion. It only describes some of the physical conditions involved in a conscious organism.
Digestion involves chemistry, but it is not "just chemistry" in the sense that any random chemical reaction is digestion. Digestion is a biological process performed by a living organism. Likewise, volition can be a real biological function of a living conscious organism, not a supernatural interruption of nature.
Causality simply means that a thing acts according to its nature. Free will does not violate causality. A choice is not causeless magic, because the choice is the cause.
A man chooses to focus, think, evade, drift, inspect, avoid, question, or judge. That act of will is not "outside nature", rather it is an action that's made possible by the kind of being that man is.
Different kinds of entities act in different ways, e.g. rocks fall, plants grow, animals perceive and move. Human beings can direct their conceptual focus. Which is natural law applied to a different kind of entity, not a suspension of natural law.

I'm harping on about this because I do not need a soul to avoid the "mechanical watch" view of man. All I need is to reject the crude reduction that treats all causation as if it had to resemble billiard balls or clockwork.
Consciousness can be real, active, causal, biological, and natural without being reducible to computation, mechanism, or a passive chemical drift.

And when it comes to AI, that just strengthens my point. If consciousness requires will, agency, and a living subject, then current computer systems are even further from intelligence than the marketing says.
 
This is mostly behaviorism and other-minds skepticism, the substance of which I have already addressed.

my bad, but in my defense, all of your posts have been like ten pages long. though it be somewhat hypocritical coming from me.

Correct, I do not directly perceive consciousness, but I infer it. I infer it from a living organism of the same kind as myself, with the same biological structure, perceptual organs, needs, actions, development, vulnerability, and self-directed behavior in the world.
That is not even remotely the same as inferring consciousness from disembodied text, images, or sounds generated by a digital system whose symbols only mean anything to the humans interpreting them.
A human speaking is a conscious living organism expressing thought through language. A chatbot outputting text is machinery producing human-interpreted symbols.
Treating those as equivalent because both can produce language is exactly the category error that I'm criticizing in the thread.

it's just psychological pattern-matching. higher levels of human intelligence do not afford you any additional insight, you're just drowning yourself in thoughts about your thoughts about your thoughts. your inference is just a supposition; you are not working from a complete data set (i.e. knowledge of the nature of consciousness), you are making a working definition of consciousness using the data available (it may act conscious, but it can't truly be experiencing consciousness unless it has a face!). which is all anyone can do, but, your mistake is assuming is assuming that you have a complete definition, or even a good definition, just because you've heaped more criteria on it. my point is not that behavior is an absolute judge of consciousness, but that the ability of humans to perceive reality is woefully inadequate.
 
it's just psychological pattern-matching. higher levels of human intelligence do not afford you any additional insight, you're just drowning yourself in thoughts about your thoughts about your thoughts. your inference is just a supposition; you are not working from a complete data set (i.e. knowledge of the nature of consciousness), you are making a working definition of consciousness using the data available (it may act conscious, but it can't truly be experiencing consciousness unless it has a face!). which is all anyone can do, but, your mistake is assuming is assuming that you have a complete definition, or even a good definition, just because you've heaped more criteria on it. my point is not that behavior is an absolute judge of consciousness, but that the ability of humans to perceive reality is woefully inadequate.
See, that's just skepticism. Yes, there is inference involved, but that does not make it arbitrary.
Most human knowledge involves inference. I do not directly perceive electrons, gravity, ancient Rome, the inside of your skull, or the digestive process occurring in someone else's stomach. But that does not mean that all claims about those things are mere psychological pattern-matching with no objective status.
You seem to be implying that the standard is omniscience, which it isn't. The standard is evidence. And the evidence for consciousness in other humans is not just "it has a face".

Like I said, I infer consciousness in other humans because they are living creatures of the same kind as myself, with the same general biological structure, development, sensory organs, needs, vulnerability, self-directed action, and expressive behavior. That is a massive causal context to say the least.
I infer animal consciousness more cautiously, by biological and behavioral similarity.
I do not infer consciousness from a disembodied text or picture generator in the same way, because the context is completely different.
A chatbot is not a living organism. It has no biological needs, no self-maintenance, no perceptual awareness, no vulnerability, no agency, no development from infancy into conceptual cognition, and most importantly, no subject to whom its words mean anything. It is machinery generating symbols that are interpreted by humans.
Those cases simply are not equivalent.

I indeed don't have a complete data set about consciousness. However, I also don't have a complete data set about digestion, life, memory, pain, or vision. That does not mean I must pretend that a simulation of digestion digests, or that a corpse is alive, or that a tape recorder feels pain, or that a camera sees.
Incomplete knowledge does not erase categorical distinctions.

Plus, I don't know what kind of point you were trying to make by calling higher-level reasoning "thoughts about thoughts about thoughts".
Human beings are conceptual creatures. We can identify abstractions, examine definitions, distinguish behavior from cognition, distinguish evidence from proof, distinguish simulation from instantiation, and distinguish a living subject from a tool. You call it drowning, I just call it thinking.
If your point is merely that humans are fallible and that our access to reality is not omniscient, fine. But fallibility does not imply epistemic paralysis. From the fact that we cannot directly perceive another consciousness, it does not follow that we have no rational basis for distinguishing a conscious organism from a text engine.
And it definitely does not follow that persuasive mimicry deserves the label "intelligence".
 
A neuron and a transistor both can be described as having on/off-like behavior ("switching") in some contexts. Which in itself is fine. But that does not mean that this switching is what explains intelligence. Lots of things can be compared at a very abstract level.
For instance, a heart valve and a plumbing valve both regulate flow. But that does not mean that a plumbing system is alive.
Or a bird wing and an airplane wing both generate lift. But that does not mean that an airplane is an animal.
Or a camera sensor and an eye both respond to light. But that does not mean that a camera sees.
So when you say that neurons are basically biological transistors, I say that, even if I grant this loose comparison, you still need to show that the transistor-like part is the part that matters for intelligence.
Like, maybe the relevant difference is that neurons are living cells inside a living organisms, unlike transistors. Or maybe the relevant difference is the whole biological system (metabolism, perception, action, development, needs, self-maintenance, and consciousness). Or maybe the relevant difference is that the brain is not an isolated circulation box, but an organ of a living animal.
Essentially, you can't simply pick one abstract similarity (switching) and treat that as if it's the whole story. It's like saying "birds fly, airplanes fly, therefore birds are just meat airplanes". The reduction is obviously not true, even though the similarity is real.
If i can replace X with Y within system A without changing it's behavior then X and Y and equivalent within relevant context, thus heart and a electromechanical pump are equivalent when it comes to circulation of blood, bird wing and airplane wing are equivalent when it comes to generation of lift etc And since you have not demonstrated that neuron and transistor are not equivalent when it comes to intelligence.
And from what is known of brain functioning it seems that 2 most important behaviours is non linear activation and rewiring - transistor per se cannot do the later however it can be emulated and creation of rewiring transistor is entirely within real of possibility perhaps by creating virtual transistor - fully equivalent to neuron within context of intelligence. Perhaps connections to other neurons could be represented as a vector so that they can be adjusted with some sort of algorithm to get desired behaviour maybe one that works from the back?
Or perhaps creation artificial intelligence from brain tissue is possible as after all one can farm human neurons.
Yes, if I claim impossibility, I owe an argument. However, the absence of a known counterexample does not establish possibility either. "You have not disproven it" is not proof that the category is non-empty.

Basically, if your position is "I don't know whether artificial intelligence is possible in some future non-natural system", that's fine, it's agnosticism.
But if your position is "digital computation could instantiate intelligence" then you owe an account for how formal switching becomes awareness, how externally interpreted symbols become meaning for the system itself, how representation becomes possession, and how a subject appears.
And if your position is "current systems are artificial intelligence" then I reject that entirely. Which is not a problem for you, since you already said you are not defending it.

The notion that digital computation as such can become intelligence is still unsupported. My claim that it is categorically impossible is extreme, but that just means, like I said in the very first line in the first post of the thread, if a single counterexample can be shown, or a proof of possibility can be made, then my position is dead as a doornail.
Then your position is unsupported and you do not get to claim what you have claimed in the title.
 
Ostatnio edytowane:
What does exist is machinery that simulates
Artifice/Artifical: simulation, simulacrum; from art + facere (to make).

QED

Vulcan, god of craft, of artifice, is lame. What kind of god is lame? The kind married to the goddess of beauty. Vulcan and Venus are married and she cucks him with all the other gods and even with some men. What does this mean in plain language? An artificial thing is machinery that simulates the natural thing; a sculpture of a bird is beautiful, but a real bird is really beautiful. Artifically means not really.
 
If i can replace X with Y within system A without changing it's behavior then X and Y and equivalent within relevant context, thus heart and a electromechanical pump are equivalent when it comes to circulation of blood, bird wing and airplane wing are equivalent when it comes to generation of lift etc
The issue here is that you're assuming, rather than showing things.
The question is whether you can replace X with Y without changing the relevant thing. That simply has not been shown.

If the relevant context is circulating blood, then yes, an electromechanical pump may be equivalent to a heart in that specific respect. But that does not make the pump "alive". It means it can perform one function (moving blood).
If the relevant context is generating lift, then yes, an airplane wing and a bird wing may be equivalent in that specific respect. But that does not make the airplane an animal. It means both can generate lift.

When you say that neurons and transistors may be equivalent, my question is: equivalent with respect to what?
Switching? Maybe.
Cognition? Not shown.
Awareness? Not shown.
Meaning? Not shown.
Concept formation? Not shown.
Subjectivity? Not shown.

You are taking equivalence in one abstract respect (switch-like behavior) and treating it as equivalence in the respect that actually matters (intelligence) and that simply does not follow.
And since you have not demonstrated that neuron and transistor are not equivalent when it comes to intelligence.
That is backwards.
You are the one proposing the equivalence. You need to show it.
You certainly do not get to say "ah yes, neurons have some switch-like properties, transistors have switch-like properties, therefore maybe transistors can replace neurons for intelligence unless you prove they cannot"
That is not an argument. It simply is an unsupported possibility claim.
Unfortunately, even if you had external behavior, that'd be insufficient to settle it. If by "without changing behavior" you mean "the system produces the same observable outputs", then all that would be established is output equivalence. That does not establish awareness, understanding, or intelligence.
Consider how a tape recorder and a human can both output the sentence "I understand", but they are not therefore equivalent with respect to understanding. Or how a book and a mathematician can both contain a proof, but they are not therefore equivalent with respect to doing mathematics. Or how a simulation of a flame and a real flame can look similar on a screen, but they are not therefore equivalent with respect to burning.

The relevant thing is whether there is a conscious subject grasping reality, forming concept, judging truth, and understanding meaning. Not bare input-output behavior. Unless you want to show that the person who parametrized the input-output is intelligent, but, come on.
Then your position is unsupported and you do not get to claim what you have claimed in the title.
You have not shown that replacing living neurons in a conscious organism with silicon switches preserves intelligence. You have only asserted that maybe it could. "Maybe" claims are cheap, "Maybe it could" does not defeat my argument. All that states is that you remain unconvinced by the impossibility claim. Which I don't even take issue with, but that's not the same thing as a refutation.

My position is that digital computation is not the kind of process that can instantiate intelligence, because it consists of formal state transitions over symbols whose meaning exists only for interpreting minds. Annoyingly, you have not answered that, you only said repeatedly that maybe some arrangement of switches could do it.
Then show how. Show how the symbol becomes meaningful to the system. Show how switching becomes awareness. Show how there is a subject to whom anything appears.
Until then, your position remains agnosticism + promissory replacement.
Either way, that doesn't make the thread title false. The title is the claim that's being defended. If you have a counterexample or proof of possibility, stop with the foreplay and just show it already. If you only have "you have not proven impossibility to my satisfaction", then you have not changed my mind.



Artifice/Artifical: simulation, simulacrum; from art + facere (to make).

QED
Maybe it sounds pedantic, but it doesn't prove what you think it proves. Etymology is not ontology.
"Artificial" broadly means made by artifice, i.e. made by human craft rather than occurring naturally. Whether an artificial xyz is really an xyz depends on what kind of thing xyz is.
An artificial lake is still a lake. An artificial satellite is still a satellite. Artificial insemination is still insemination. An artificial heart, insofar as it actually pumps blood, really does perform the heart function.
But an artificial flower is not a biological flower. A sculpture of a bird is not a bird. A simulation of fire is not fire. A simulation of intelligence is not intelligence.
So the word "artificial" does not automatically mean "not really". Nor does it automatically mean "really"! It depends on the identity conditions of the thing being discussed.

If intelligence means actual cognition, awareness, understanding, judgment, concept formation etc., then artificial intelligence would actually have to instantiate those things.
If it merely simulates intelligence-looking behavior, then it is not artificial intelligence. It is artificial imitation of intelligence.
Artificial light is light because photons are being emitted. A sculpture of a bird is not a bird because it lacks life, metabolism, perception, action, reproduction, etc. A chatbot is not intelligent because it lacks awareness, meaning, judgment, concept formation, valuation, and understanding.
If "AI" only means machinery that simulates intelligence, then calling it artificial intelligence is exactly the kind of misleading category assignment that I'm criticizing.
 
I indeed don't have a complete data set about consciousness. However, I also don't have a complete data set about digestion, life, memory, pain, or vision.

you can physically observe the processes of a stomach or an eye. you can't cut open a brain and observe consciousness. therefore there is a strong basis of knowledge for the former, but not for the latter.
 
My position is that digital computation is not the kind of process that can instantiate intelligence, because it consists of formal state transitions over symbols whose meaning exists only for interpreting minds. Annoyingly, you have not answered that, you only said repeatedly that maybe some arrangement of switches could do it.
Then show how. Show how the symbol becomes meaningful to the system. Show how switching becomes awareness. Show how there is a subject to whom anything appears.
Until then, your position remains agnosticism + promissory replacement.
Either way, that doesn't make the thread title false. The title is the claim that's being defended. If you have a counterexample or proof of possibility, stop with the foreplay and just show it already. If you only have "you have not proven impossibility to my satisfaction", then you have not changed my mind.
You have not proven anything at all your focus on meaning is utterly irervelant to the issue at hand. That you do not get to claim X does not mean that X is false but that your justification is garbage which it is.
You do not get to claim that Riemann Hypothesis is true or fact without demonstrating those things, however it does not mean that it does not have logical value.
And yes my position is agnosticism.
In order for what you are saying to have any sense what so ever you would need to define computer like absolute nigger and artificaly say that what is clearly a computer is not one because of technicality yet then what you are saying is nothing more than meaningless tautology.
If no meaning could arise from things with no meaning inteligence would not exists at all, and we would not be arguing therefore there must be a way that it can be done unless what you are proposing is existence of God.
 
Ostatnio edytowane:
Maybe it sounds pedantic, but it doesn't prove what you think it proves. Etymology is not ontology ...
"Artificial" broadly means made by artifice
📿🐷

Nigga out here completely ignoring the ontology of artifice itself as an excuse to contra mundi an onomastic tidal wave whilst defining a word with itself.
 
you can physically observe the processes of a stomach or an eye. you can't cut open a brain and observe consciousness. therefore there is a strong basis of knowledge for the former, but not for the latter.
Doesn't work.
You can't cut open a body and "observe pain" either. You can observe nerves, tissue damage, brain activity, stress responses, etc. But the pain as pain is not visible on the operating table.
Same with memory. You can observe brain structures and neural activity. You cannot cut open a brain and see "my memory of my childhood dog" sitting there.
Same with vision. You can inspect the eye, retina, optic nerve, and visual cortex. But conscious seeing is not physically visible as such. You observe the biological machinery involved in vision, not the first-person act of seeing.

So if your standard is "I must be able to physically observe the conscious state by cutting the body open", then you have just successfully ruled out direct knowledge of pain, memory, thought, fear, desire, intention, and every other conscious phenomenon.
That standard is absurd.



And yes my position is agnosticism.
Fine.
That just means you haven't refuted the title, and that you are not convinced by my proof.
Which I can live with, but it isn't a counterargument of the kind I requested.
You have provided neither a counterexample nor a proof of possibility.
You keep saying "you have not proven impossibility" - fine, that is your assessment. But your assessment is not itself a proof of impossibility, it's just your refusal to accept my impossibility argument.
your focus on meaning is utterly irervelant to the issue at hand.
Plainly false.
If a machine prints out the word "horse", does "horse" mean anything to the machine?
If Grok says "I understand", does it understand what "understand" means?
If a model labels some pixels in a video feed as "dog", is there anything in the system to which "dog" refers as dog?
This is not merely some irrelevant side issue, it is the whole issue.
Intelligence is not just some stuff happening. Intelligence is awareness of something. It involves grasping, identifying, judging, understanding, referring, meaning.
A smoke alarm produces the right alarm output, it does not understand smoke, it is not intelligent. I think I've made more than enough examples for today.

When I ask how symbols become meaningful to the system, I am not changing the subject. I am asking the exact question that separates intelligence from machinery.
If meaning is irrelevant, then you are no longer talking about intelligence. Maybe you're talking about output behavior.
Yes, my claim is extreme. Which I said in the very first sentence of this thread. But an extreme claim is not refuted by "maybe not". It is refuted by showing any counterexample or showing the possibility.

Your current position is essentially "I do not know whether digital computation can instantiate intelligence"
Mine is "it cannot, because digital computation consists of formal state changes over symbols whose meaning exists only for interpreting minds"
You do not need to accept my argument, I'll live, I promise. But if all you have is "I remain agnostic", then you have neither changed my mind nor have you shown that the thread title is false.



📿🐷

Nigga out here completely ignoring the ontology of artifice itself as an excuse to contra mundi an onomastic tidal wave whilst defining a word with itself.
"Made by artifice" is not circular in the vicious sense, it is genus-location, not a full metaphysical treatise.
If you dislike the phrasing: "artificial" means produced by deliberate craft rather than by unassisted natural generation.
With this, the ouroboros should have been slain, the onomastic tempest is bottled, and the point remains exactly where it was (whether an artificial xyz is really xyz depends on the identity conditions of xyz)
Ludum modo amisti
 
If your point is merely that humans are fallible and that our access to reality is not omniscient, fine. But fallibility does not imply epistemic paralysis. From the fact that we cannot directly perceive another consciousness, it does not follow that we have no rational basis for distinguishing a conscious organism from a text engine.
And it definitely does not follow that persuasive mimicry deserves the label "intelligence".

sure it does. because you cannot say for sure that human intelligence itself is not simple mimicry. do you believe your own experience of consciousness gives rise to all your behaviors? perhaps you are simply an elaborate stimulus response machine that experiences consciousness as an incidental aftereffect. that's not necessarily what I believe, however, it is impossible to conclusively disprove such a thing, because again, the precursors to human consciousness are a mystery.

So if your standard is "I must be able to physically observe the conscious state by cutting the body open", then you have just successfully ruled out direct knowledge of pain, memory, thought, fear, desire, intention, and every other conscious phenomenon.
That standard is absurd.

you say that, but psychological phenomena are poorly understood. memory, emotions, personality, these things are something that clearly happens in the brain, but a true understanding of how yet eludes modern science. pain - a physical phenomenon - is easily induced. memory - a psychological phenomenon - is not. it is possible to construct a synthetic stomach, or eye, or heart, or even nerves with sufficiently advanced materials and manufacturing technology. the brain, on the other hand, at least in regard to its function of producing consciousness, is totally a black box. so on the one hand, you could say it's impossible to artificially produce consciousness, because an artificial device that produces consciousness has never been built. on the other hand, you could also say that it's impossible to tell if we've created synthetic consciousness, because we have no way of physically defining it.
 
Ostatnio edytowane:
Plainly false.
bla bla bla
Your current position is essentially "I do not know whether digital computation can instantiate intelligence"
Mine is "it cannot, because digital computation consists of formal state changes over symbols whose meaning exists only for interpreting minds"
The meaning of those symbols is irrevelant. The only nessecity for computation to occur is descrete state changes. An random machine can perform computation in which state transitions, and states themself have no meaning due to being random. Clearly phisical process of some sort can result in intelligence why then it cannot be descrete to qualify as computation and why must it be analog as opposed to digital?
You have not "demonstrated to sufficiently high standard" you have not demonstrated anything at all.
 
Ostatnio edytowane:
sure it does. because you cannot say for sure that human intelligence itself is not simple mimicry. do you believe your own experience of consciousness gives rise to all your behaviors? perhaps you are simply an elaborate stimulus response machine that experiences consciousness as an incidental aftereffect. that's not necessarily what I believe, however, it is impossible to conclusively disprove such a thing, because again, the precursors to human consciousness are a mystery.
Simply doesn't follow.
"You cannot conclusively disprove radical skepticism" is not an argument. It is a solvent that dissolves every claim, including your own.
If human intelligence is "simple mimicry" then your claim that it may be simple mimicry is also mimicry. It has no cognitive authority. You do not get to use reasoning to undermine reasoning and then keep the conclusion as if it were reasoned, period.
My direct awareness of my consciousness is not an optional theory inferred from behavior. I am aware. I think. I judge. I choose to focus or not to focus. I even grant that this capacity is something you too are capable of! And it is indeed more basic than any speculation about hidden "precursors".

The fact that we don't know every physical precondition of consciousness doesn't mean consciousness is epistemically up for grabs, so to speak. An unknown mechanism is not the same thing as an unknown existence.
Anyway, in short, the possibility that someone can utter "maybe human intelligence is mimicry too" does not get rid of the distinction between a conscious organism and a text engine.



The meaning of those symbols is irrevelant. The only nessecity for computation to occur is descrete state changes.
bla bla bla?
You skipped the load-bearing part and then argued for something I never denied.
Yes, discrete state changes can occur. Yes, digital computation can occur. Yes, a physical system can be described as moving from one state to another.
None of that establishes intelligence.

I mean, at this point you're defending the possibility of computation, not the possibility of cognition. This thread is not "can discrete state changes occur?", it is about whether compute hardware/software can instantiate intelligence.
Which is why meaning is not irrelevant.
Meaning may be entirely irrelevant to bare state transitions. But it is not irrelevant to intelligence. An "intelligence" to which nothing means anything is not an intelligence. It is just a process that produces states.
An random machine can perform computation in which state transitions
This proves my point. Not yours.
If the states have no meaning to the system, then the system has not reached intelligence. What you are describing is uninterpreted physical activity or, at most, computation as modeled by an outside observer.

Look, do you agree that some things are not the same thing?
Like, "physical state change" is not the same as "computation in the cognitive sense"
And "computation" is not the same as "awareness"
And "awareness" is not the same as "externally interpreted output"
why must it be analog as opposed to digital?
If an analog system also merely produces uninterpreted state changes, it would fail for the same reason. The problem is not that digital systems are discrete. It's that formal computation does not by itself produce a subject to whom anything appears or means anything. So the question misses the point.
I am not saying intelligence must be analog. I am saying intelligence is not established by computation, regardless whether it's digital, analog, stochastic, or whatever else. It just so happens at >99.9% of computers in this solar system happen to be digital, for many good reasons.
Clearly phisical process of some sort can result in inteligence
I agree 100%. Humans are physical living organisms and they are intelligent.
However, from that, it does not follow that any physical process, or any discrete computational process can instantiate intelligence. That's the gap. Repeating "discrete computation can happen" does not bridge it.
 
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