U.S. v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120 (8th Cir. 1973)
Nebraska law provided a two-step proc edure for determining if a patient was mentally ill and in need of hospitalization:
1) the patient may be temporarily hospitalized, up to 60 days, for observation if the County Mental Health Board determines he is mentally ill and in need of hospitalization, and
2) the patient may later be committed to the hospital if the superintendent determines he is mentally ill and should be admitted, and certifies this to the Board.
Defendant had been hospitalized under step #1. He was found not to have a serious mental disorder and was released after two weeks. Step #2 was not reached. The Court found that this did not count as a commitment.
U.S. v. Giardina, 861 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1988)
Louisiana law provides for “admission by emergency certificate.” A doctor examines the patient and certifies mental illness or substance abuse, and dangerousness. This allows for transportation and admission to the hospital. Within 72 hours of admission, examination by a second doctor is required. If the patient is to be held beyond 15 days, there must be a judicial commitment. Giardina was admitted under this procedure, but discharged by the hospital before a hearing was required. The Court found that this did not count as a commitment.
U.S. v. Waters, 23 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1994)
New York state law allows for involuntary hospitalization based on an application for admission by a relative or other qualified person, followed by certificates from two doctors that the patient is in need of involuntary treatment. The patient can request a hearing at any time during the first 60 days of hospitalization. There is no automatic hearing. After 60 days, the hospital can request a hearing to further extend the involuntary hospitalization, or the patient can sign himself in as a voluntary patient.
Mr. Waters did not request a hearing, and signed himself in voluntarily at the 60-day mark. He was released seven months later. The Court found that this did count as a commitment.
U.S. v. Whiton, 48 F.3d 356 (8th Cir. 1995)
Defendant had been involuntarily admitted to a hospital in Texas after an application for commitment, examinations by two psychologists, and a court order committing him for up to 90 days. This did count as a commitment.
U.S. v. Chamberlain, 159 F.3d 656 (1st Cir. 1998)
Maine law allows for involuntary emergency admission based on:
1. an application (by anyone) alleging mental illness and likelihood of serious harm,
2. examination by a doctor on the same day, certifying mental illness and likelihood of serious harm,
3. a Judge reviews the application/certification, endorses them as having been prepared in accordance with the law, and orders admission to the hospital for up to 5 days, and
4. a second doctor examines the patient within 24 hours of admission and also certifies mental illness and likelihood of serious harm. Within those first five days of hospitalization, the hospital may seek an involuntary commitment in district court. This is a full adversarial hearing with counsel provided for the patient. The patient may also convert to voluntary status, in which case there is no hearing. Mr. Chamberlain signed voluntary during the first five days. The Court found that this did count as a commitment.
U.S. v. Midgett, 198 F.3d 143 (4th Cir. 1999)
Defendant had been charged with breaking and entering in Virginia, and the court ordered an evaluation of his competence to stand trial. After reviewing the doctor’s report and hearing evidence, the court concluded he was not competent to stand trial and needed inpatient care to treat his mental illness and restore him to capacity. Defendant was ordered into the hospital for treatment. After two months of treatment, doctors concluded he was not competent for trial and was not restorable for the foreseeable future, but was also not dangerous to self or others. Defendant went home after the DA declined to pursue the case. Defendant later was arrested by the Secret Service and charged with possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4). The Court concluded that defendant’s confinement for restoration of competency did count as a commitment.
U.S. v. Vertz, 102 F.Supp. 2d 787 (2000)
Defendant was admitted to a Michigan hospital based on a nurse’s petition, accompanied by a doctor’s certificate stating he was mentally ill, dangerous to self and others, and in need of treatment. Defendant consented to treatment pending his court hearing. A second doctor also certified that he was mentally ill and dangerous. At the hearing, the Probate Court found mental illness and need for treatment, but discharged Vertz from the hospital after finding that less restrictive treatment was appropriate and available.
The Court found that this did count as a commitment.
U.S. v. Buffaloe, 449 F.2d 779(4th Cir. 1971)
Defendant had been found not guilty by reason of insanity of a Virginia charge of maiming. After his release from the hospital, he was charged under 18 U.S.C. 922. The Court found that the NGRI hospitalization did count as a commitment. See also Redford v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 691 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1982).
